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THE INNOCENT VICTIMS OF A POLICE ACTION
Ellis Craig*
Salus populi est suprema lex . . .  is based on the implied agreement of 
every member of society that his own individual welfare shall, in cases of 
necessity, yield to that of the community; and that his property, liberty, 
and life shall, under certain circumstances, be placed in jeopardy or even 
sacrificed for the public good.
Broom’s Legal Maxims
In the course of his duties a police officer, to be effective, must 
do things that would otherwise qualify as torts, crimes, or both. ‘‘It 
takes a crook to catch a crook” , the old saying goes. A speeding 
motorist will not be stopped by the policeman who obeys the speed 
limit himself, and the use of potentially fatal force to halt a fleeing 
murderer or bank robber often involves risk to the innocent as well, 
especially in our crowded urban centres.
A police officer must be given a reasonable degree of protection 
against criminal charges and tort liability; otherwise his ability to 
take effective action when enforcing the law would be substantially 
impaired. And so we have s. 25(1) of the Criminal Code which 
operates as his first line of defence:
25(1) Everyone who is required or authorized by law to do anything in the 
administration or enforcement of the law . . .
(b) as a peace officer . . .  
is, if he acts on reasonable and probable grounds, justified in doing what 
he is required or authorized to do and in using as much force as is neces­
sary for that purpose.
In short, if the law permits or requires him to take action to enforce 
the law, he will be insulated from both civil liability and criminal 
responsibility as long as he acts on reasonable and probable 
grounds. These grounds need not be absolute or even substantial; it 
is enough if the facts are sufficient “ to create a reasonable suspicion in 
the mind of a reasonable man.” 1 To penetrate this shield is a form­
idable task, except in those few cases where a police officer blatantly 
oversteps his authority.
But surely the protection of s. 25(1) operates only against 
wrongdoers and will have no effect when innocent parties are injured
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of New Brunswick. From 1955 to 1975 
Professor Craig was a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
I Broughton v. Jackson (1852), 18 Q.B. 378 at p. 385, 118 E.R. 141; Kennedy v. 
Tomlinson et al (1959), 20 D.L.R. (2d) 273 (Ont. C.A.).
U.N.B. LA W  JOURNAL 35
or their property damaged during a police action? Not so; it is a 
blanket protection. It is settled law, on the highest authority,2 that 
s. 25 relieves the police officer of liability toward lawbreaker and 
innocent victim alike.
As an additional stumbling block, some jurisdictions require 
permission of the executive branch of government before an action 
may be taken against a police officer.1
In the face of these barriers, what hope of redress does the 
innocent victim of a police action have? There are three avenues he 
may explore: first, the possibility of a successful civil action in spite 
of the obstacles; second, the possibility of statutory compensation; 
third, the possibility of a discretionary settlement.
TO RT L IA B IL IT Y  OF A POLICE OFFICER: A PERSPECTIVE
The leading case on liability to innocent parties is the decision 
of the Supreme Court of Canada in Priestman v. Colangelo. 4 In 
that case two police officers in a cruiser were trying to stop a stolen 
car before it reached a busy intersection. Three attempts were made 
to get in front of it, at great danger to the officers, and a warning 
shot was fired, to no avail. One of the officers, Priestman, then fired 
at the rear tire of the stolen car. At that moment the police car hit a 
bump in the road. The shot missed the tire, ricocheted off the lower 
edge of the rear window and hit the driver, causing him to lose 
control of his vehicle which struck and killed two nurses waiting for 
a bus. The action against the police officer on behalf of the two 
nurses failed, by a margin of three to two, despite the fact that the 
shot was deliberately fired on a busy city street and resulted in the 
deaths of two innocent people.
The case raises two issues relevant to a discussion of liability to 
innocent parties.5 First, to what extent is the standard of care to be 
expected of a police officer affected by his “duty” — what he is 
required by law to do? Second, should the concept of duty be placed 
upon a sliding scale, to be undertaken, executed or abandoned 
depending on the seriousness of each case?
2 Priestman v. Colangelo and Smythson, (1959] S.C.R. 615, 19 D.L.R. (2d) 1; 
Poupart v. Lafortune (1974), 41 D .LR. (3d) 720 (S.C.C.).
3 e.g. Royal Canadian M ounted Police Act. R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 1%, S. 4 (still in force, 
although not included in R.S.N.B. 1973).
4 Supra, footnote 2.
5 There are, of course, other issues and other perspectives. See Linden, Canadian 
Negligence Law (1972), 13 et. seq. for a disussion of the Priestman case in the con­
text of social utility and its relationship to unreasonable risk.
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There is a general duty on police officers to preserve the peace 
and, where appropriate, to arrest offenders, either by a requirement 
of the common law or one specifically imposed by statu te .6 Particu­
lar duties may be imposed as well. Over the years, both within and 
outside police circles, the word “duty” has acquired a connotation as 
something one is bound, as a matter of honour, to fulfill — duty to 
country, for example. As a result many police officers are under the 
impression, mistaken or otherwise, that the existence of a duty gives 
them no discretion, that they must undertake and discharge it, 
although it is far from clear in most cases what happens if they 
fa il.7
With these preliminary remarks in mind, let us examine the two 
issues raised. The first question is whether the existence of a duty 
modifies in any way the standard of care to be expected of a police 
officer? Should less be expected of him in relation to the care he 
takes to avoid injury to others because he is attempting to discharge 
a duty imposed by law?
An English court has held that there is no difference between 
the standard of care demanded of a private citizen and the standard 
required of a police officer, even when the latter is statutorily 
exempted from obeying a speed lim it!8 In Canada, however, there 
is a difference. In Priestman v. Colangelo Mr. Justice Locke, 
speaking for the majority, said:
It is to be remembered that [the policemen] were exercising powers confer­
red upon them by the Criminal Code and, at the same time, attempting to 
discharge a duty imposed upon them by the Police A ct  . . .  The officers 
were thus not merely performing an act permitted by these statutes but 
engaged in the performance of what was a duty imposed upon them, a fact 
which, in my view, has a vital bearing upon the question [of liability]. 9
After examining cases supporting the position that the existence of 
statutory powers does not relieve police officers of a duty to take 
reasonable care in their exercise, according to the circumstances,10 
Mr. Justice Locke continued:
In deciding whether in any particular case a police officer had used more 
force than is reasonably necessary, general statements as to the duty to take
6 See Priestman v. Colangelo and the various provincial Police Acts  as examples.
7. The word "duty" is widely used to denote moral, as well as legal, obligations; a 
moral obligation may well have no sanction; internal administrative action may be 
taken whether or not a breach of duty amounts to the breach of a legal obligation; 
penalties may be provided in the criminal or quasi-criminal law for failure to ful­
fill a duty; it is only when the breach of a “duty o f care" is found to exist that 
negligence law can operate as a sanction.
8 Gaynor v. Allen  [1959] 2 Q.B. 43 (for a criticism o f this case see 78 L.Q.R. 490).
9 Supra, footnote 2, at pp. 617-618 (S.C.R.)
10 Ibid.. at pp. 618-620.
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care to avoid injury to others made in negligence cases (listed] cannot be 
accepted as applicable without reservation unless full weight is given to the 
fact that the act complained of is one done under statutory powers and in 
pursuance o f a statutory duty..........
The performance of a duty imposed upon police officers . . .  may, at times 
and of necessity, involve risk o f injury to other members o f the community.
Such risk, in the absence o f a negligent or unreasonable exercise o f such 
duty, is imposed by the statute and any resulting damage is, in my opinion, 
damnum sine injuria. 11
The principle has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court on 
several occasions. In Kirkpatrick v. Lament Mr. Justice Spence said:
It must be remembered that . . .  in any particular case . . .  general state­
ments as to the duty to take care to avoid injuries to others derived from 
negligence cases must be accepted with reservation and only upon giving 
full weight to the fact that the act complained of is one done under statu­
tory powers and in pursuance o f a statutory duty. 12
and in Poupart v. Lafortune, a statement by Mr. Justice Fauteaux:
[The police officer] was not engaged merely in performing an act permitted 
by law, but which is quite a different matter . . .  he was engaged in the 
hazardous performance of a grave duty imposed on him by law . . .  the 
actions o f Lafortune cannot, in a case like that before the Court, be 
evaluated as they would be if it were a case in which the precautions to be 
taken in accordance with the duty not to injure others were not conditioned 
by the requirements o f a public duty. In short, the police officer incurs no 
liability for damage caused to another when without negligence he does 
precisely what the Legislature requires him to do . . .  13
There are dicta in the cases, therefore, fully supporting the 
position that the existence of a duty on a police officer will affect the 
standard of care demanded of him. It will be something less than 
that demanded of a private citizen, but will ordinarily stop short of 
being non-existent. As Professor Fleming has pointed out:
Exceptionally, the social utility o f a particular activity may be valued so 
highly as to warrant the complete negation of any duty of care, as in the 
case o f combat operations against the enemy causing civilian loss or injury.
More usually, however, the importance of the interest which the defendant 
is seeking to advance will only affect the standard of care or, rather, what is 
incumbent on him for meeting that standard. A fire brigade or ambulance, 
for example, may proceed at any speed and take some traffic risks which 
would be unjustifiable for a Sunday driver, but must still conform to the 
standard of care proper for one bent on such an errand of urgency. Nor 
may a policeman, in discharging his duty to apprehend felons, ignore 
entirely the safety o f innocent persons, though he is apparently justified to 
resort to measures, even the use o f firearms, which involve some risk of 
injury to bystanders but are no more than reasonably necessary to effect his 
purpose. I4
11 Ibid.. at pp. 622-623 (S.C.R.)
12 Kirkpatrick v. Lament (1956), 51 D.L.R. (2d) 699, at p. 705.
13 Poupart v. Lafortune. supra, footnote 2, at p. 726.
14 Fleming, The Law o f  Torts (4th ed.), at p. 115, citing Priestman v. Colangelo, and 
Beim  v. Goyer. [1965] S.C.R. 638.
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To summarize the first issue, if a police officer has reasonable 
and probable grounds and legal authority, the existence of a duty to 
preserve the peace or apprehend criminals carries with it a duty of 
care to act reasonably in the exercise of that authority. If his action is 
reasonable in the circumstances, particularly after taking into 
account the possibility of injury to innocent parties, he will not be 
civilly liable and innocent persons incidentally injured will be left to 
bear their loss.
This brings us to the second question, whether “duty” can be 
treated as a relative term instead of an absolute.
The exercise of a duty, in my opinion, must be placed on a 
sliding scale. Notwithstanding s. 25 of the Code, which seems to offer 
a blanket protection on its face, judicial interpretation has made it 
necessary for a police officer to evaluate the seriousness of the 
consequences before undertaking a duty. He must ask himself 
whether he should perform the duty at all and, if performance is 
undertaken, he must then be careful not to perform it negligently; he 
must even be prepared to abandon it completely if the consequences 
of his performance will be out of proportion to the deed.
In his dissenting opinion in the Priestman case, Mr. Justice 
Cartwright said at page 634:
This duty to apprehend was not. in my opinion, an absolute one to the 
performance of which Priestman was bound regardless o f the consequences 
to persons other than Smythson. Co-existent with the duty to apprehend 
Smythson was the fundamental duty alterum non laedere. not to do an act 
which a reasonable man placed in Priestman’s position should have fore­
seen was likely to cause injury to persons in the vicinity.
And at page 635:
Should a reasonable man in Priestman’s position have refrained from 
firing although that would result in Smythson escaping, or should he have 
fired although foreseeing the probability that grave injury would result 
therefrom to innocent persons? I do not think an answer can be given 
which would fit all situations. The officer should, I think, consider the 
gravity o f the offence of which the fugitive is believed to be guilty and the 
likelihood of danger toother citizens if  he remains at liberty; the reasons in 
favour of firing would obviously be far greater in the case o f an armed 
robber who has already killed to facilitate his flight than in the case of an 
unarmed youth who has stolen a suitcase which he has abandoned in the 
course o f running away. In the former case it might well be the duty o f the 
officer to fire if it seemed probable that this would bring down the 
murderer even though the firing were attended by risks to other persons on 
the street. In the latter case he ought not, in my opinion, to fire if  to do so 
would be attended by any foreseeable risk of injury to innocent persons.
And at page 636:
. . .  if, as it was put in argument, the continuation o f the pursuit would 
almost inevitably result in disaster, it is my opinion that the duty o f the 
police was to reduce their speed and it may be to abandon the pursuit 
rather than to open fire.
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The majority, although arriving at a different conclusion on the 
facts, did not necessarily disagree with the reasoning of Mr. Justice 
Cartwright. Mr. Justice Locke posed three hypothetical, on an 
escalating scale:
Assuming a case where a police officer sees a pickpocket stealing from a 
person in a crowd upon the street and the pickpocket flees through the 
crowd in the hope of escaping arrest, if  the officer in pursuit unintentional­
ly collides with some one, is it to be seriously suggested that an action for 
trespass to the person would lie at the instance o f the person struck? Yet. if 
the test applied in the cases which are relied upon is adopted without 
restriction, it could be said with reason that the police officer would 
probably know that, if he ran through a crowd o f people in an attempt to 
arrest a thief, he might well collide with some members o f the crowd who 
did not see him coming. To take another hypothetical case, assume a police 
officer is pursuing a bank robber known to be armed and with the reputa­
tion of being one who will use a gun to avoid capture. The escaping 
criminal takes refuge in a private house. The officer, knowing that to enter 
the house through the front door would be to invite destruction, proceeds 
to the side o f the house where through a window he sees the man and fires 
through the window intending to disable him. Would an action lie at the 
instance o f the owner of the house against the officer for negligently 
damaging his property? If an escaping bank robber who has murdered a 
bank employee is fleeing down an uncrowded city street and fires a revolver 
at the police officers who are pursuing him, should one of the officers 
return the fire in an attempt to disable the criminal and, failing to hit the 
man. wound a pedestrian some distance down the street o f whose presence 
he is unaware, is the officer to be found liable for damages or negligence?
The answer to a claim in any of these suppositious cases would be that the 
act was done in a reasonable attempt by the officer to perform the duty 
imposed upon him  by the Police A ct and the Criminal Code, which would 
be a complete defence, in my opinion. As contrasted with cases such as 
these, if an escaping criminal ran into a crowd of people and was obscured 
from the view of the pursuing police officer, it could not be suggested that 
it would be permissible for the latter to fire through the crowd in the hope 
of stopping the fleeing criminal. 15
But what if the police officer in the first hypothetical case fired a 
shot at the pickpocket and wounded a pedestrian? Then, I would 
argue, the reasoning of Cartwright, J. would be accepted. This 
conclusion, I suggest, is inherent in the wording of the second last 
paragraph of the majority judgment of Mr. Justice Locke:
In my opinion, the action of the appellant in the present matter was reason­
ably necessary in the circumstances and no more than those reasonably 
necessary, both to prevent the escape and to protect those persons whose 
safety might have been endangered if the escaping car reached the inter­
section with Pape Ave. So far as Priestman was concerned, the fact that the 
bullet struck Smythson was, in my opinion, simply an accident. As to the 
loss occasioned by this lamentable occurrence, I consider that no cause of 
action is disclosed as against the appellant.16
15 Priestman v. Colangelo, at pp. 623-624 (emphasis added).
16 Ibid, at p. 627.
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Further, in Goyer v. Gordon,17 in dissenting judgment, Mr. 
Justice Montgomery of the Quebec Court of Appeal distinguished 
the facts of the case from Priestman v. Colangelo in a manner 
leaving no doubt that a sliding scale of duty exists:
. . .  this is not a case where the police were acting in self-defence or to pre­
vent any immediate damage to persons or property, or were faced with any
emergency calling upon them to take drastic action to protect the public. 18
Later, when the case was heard by the Supreme Court of Canada, 
Mr. Justice Montgomery’s reasons were adopted in toto by the 
majority.19
In short, in the leading case of Priestman v. Colangelo the 
majority held that the action taken by the police officer was reason­
ably necessary in the circumstances of that case, but the presence of 
a strong dissenting judgment and dicta in other cases tell us that the 
principle cannot be pushed too far; the existence of a duty or 
authorization does not entitle the police to exercise their authority 
without qualification. Their actions will be judged in light of the 
facts of each case.
However, in the vast majority of cases, there is no need for the 
police to overstep their authority, and normally they will not do so. 
Unless they do, anyone injured as a consequence of a police action 
will, at common law, be consistently left to bear his own loss.
Property, Liberty and Life
The innocent victim may suffer loss in three ways. His property 
may be damaged or destroyed, he may lose his liberty and he may 
suffer personal injury or death. The applicable principle, that the 
police will not be liable if they act reasonably in the course of their 
duties, comes from the cases where innocent bystanders have been 
killed or injured, directly or indirectly, as the result of police using 
firearms in an attempt to stop fleeing criminals. The principle is 
equally applicable when loss occurs in relation to liberty and 
property.
In Fletcher v. Collins,20 the plaintiff was arrested on a warrant 
and detained approximately four hours before the police were able 
to determine he was not the man named in the warrant. The names 
were identical. His action was dismissed because the court found the 
officers involved acted reasonably in the circumstances. In a similar
17 Goyer v. Gordon (1964), 50 D.L.R. (2d) 550 (Que. Q.B.)
18 Ibid. at p. 552.
19 Beim v Goyer, supra, footnote 14, per Mr. Justice Abbott at p. 255.
20 Fletcher v. Collins (1968), 70 D.L.R. (2d) 183 (Ont. H.C.).
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case, Crowe v. Noon, 21 a suspect was arrested on a warrant and held 
in prison for twelve days before it was conclusively proved that he 
was not the man named in the warrant. Again, the arresting officer 
was absolved:
In the circumstances o f the present case, on the facts ascertained by the 
defendant Noon, I think they could lead a reasonably prudent man to a 
reasonable suspicion that the plaintiff was the man referred to in the 
warrant.22
Twelve days, and no remedy at common law to the victim of a 
mistake! It may have been a little consolation for him to find out he 
was the victim of a reasonable mistake.
With respect to destruction of property, the principle derived 
from Priestman v. Colangelo is again applicable, by analogy, to 
personal injury cases. Three actual situations come to mind from 
personal experience in dealing with the legal issues involved in each.
In the first situation, a landlady rented a house to a motorcycle 
gang, the members using it as a headquarters. Two major police 
raids were later made on the premises, resulting in substantial 
damage on each occasion.
In the second instance, the owner of a bus reported his vehicle 
stolen. In a subsequent pursuit the police recovered the bus, 
complete with numerous bullet holes and broken glass. The owner 
felt the bus was in better condition before the police became 
involved!
The third case, well publicized, involved the destruction of a 
dwelling house. The police, seeking to arrest an armed youth barri­
caded in the residence, used numerous cannisters of tear gas in an 
effort to force him to surrender. They at no time exceeded their 
authority. The house eventually caught fire (probably, although not 
conclusively, from flame generated by one of the cannisters). The 
youth was forced from the house by the flames, but shot himself 
before he could be arrested. The owner of the house (his mother) lost 
her home and all her belongings.
There was potential legal liability in the first case, although it 
never reached a court of law, because of a certain amount of vindic­
tive damage. In the second and third instances, however, there was 
virtually no hope of success in any legal action which might have 
been taken against the police.2J
21 Crowe v. Noon et al (1970). 16 D.L.R. (3d) 22 (Ont. H.C.).
22 Ibid. at p. 31.
23 An interesting argument could be made if  a similar case came to trial. Given the 
known penchant o f tear gas containers to spout flame and start fires, would police 
be acting reasonably in omitting to have a fire truck standing by before firing the 
canisters into the house? Would this be an unreasonable risk amounting to negli­
gence?
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To take another aspect of the problem, some of the wide powers 
of search enjoyed by the police give rise to the possibility of extensive 
destruction to property with no redress as a matter of right. Section 
10 of the Narcotic Control A c t24 is one of the most notorious, 
reading in part as follows:
10.(1) A peace officer may, at anytim e,
(a) without a warrant enter and search any place other than a dwelling- 
house, and under the authority of a writ o f assistance or a warrant 
issued under this section, enter and search any dwelling-house in which 
he reasonably believes there is a narcotic by means of or in respect of 
which an offence under this Act has been com m itted. . .
(4) For the purpose o f exercising his authority under this section, a peace 
officer may. with such assistance as he deems necessary, break open any 
door, window, lock, fastener, floor, wall, ceiling, compartment, plumbing 
Fixture, box. container or any other thing. . . .
A few years ago newsmagazines carried pictures of a house in 
the United States which had been almost demolished during an in­
tensive search by federal narcotics agents. To my knowledge, 
nothing comparable has happened in Canada. However, doors are 
“kicked in” every day and other minor damage is constantly 
inflicted during police searches. Under the present state of the law, 
there is no legal liability for such damage — as long as the police are 
acting reasonably in the course of their duties.
Barring a change in the philosophy enshrined in Priestman v. 
Colangelo, the innocent victims of a police action will only succeed in 
a civil action if the police create the opportunity themselves, by over­
stepping the bounds of proper police procedures. Given the extent of 
police powers in Canada, this is not likely in most cases. If the victim 
is denied redress at common law, where may he then turn? There are 
two further avenues to explore.
STATUTORY COMPENSATION: CRIMINAL INJURIES COM­
PENSATION ACTS
Section 3(2) of the New Brunswick Compensation for Victims o f  
Crime A c t25 reads as follows:
3(2) Where a person is injured, is killed or suffers loss o f or damage to 
property by an act or omission in New Brunswick occurring during or 
resulting from
(a) the lawful arrest o f or attempt to lawfully arrest a person committing 
or suspected of having committed an offence under a statute o f Canada or 
New Brunswick,
24 Narcotic Control Act. R.S.C. 1979, Chap. N-l
25 Compensation fo r  Victims o f  Crime Act. R.S.N.B. 1973, c. C-14. Section 3(2) (a) is 
particularly applicable to the present discussion. Under (b) and (c) an innocent 
person will invariably be the “victim” of a criminal, not a police officer.
I
(b) the prevention of or attempt to prevent the commission of an offence 
under a statute o f Canada or New Brunswick, or
(c) the rendering of assistance to a peace officer in New Brunswick who 
was carrying out his duties with respect to enforcement o f law,
the judge may, on application therefore and after a hearing, make an order 
for compensation.
Eight of the nine common law provinces have similar statutory 
schemes offering compensation to victims of crime who have 
suffered bodily injury or d ea th .26 The New Brunswick statute is 
unique in that s. 3(2) provides for “ loss of or damage to property,” a 
provision lacking in the other statu tes.27
These Acts, of relatively recent vintage,28 should be considered 
not only in relation to victims of crime, but also in regard to 
“victims” of the police. They may provide an alternative to civil 
action, in whole or in part, or they may offer redress in cases when 
civil action will probably be unsuccessful. For example, if the case of 
the house destroyed by fire had happened in New Brunswick it 
would have been possible to obtain a compensation order concerning 
the loss of property; in the jurisdiction where the fire actually occur­
red there was no such possibility.24
For all its availability, New Brunswick has had but one award 
under its Compensation for Victims o f Crime Act involving loss 
attributable to police action.10 In that case a man went to the 
Applicant’s home, confessed to a murder, and then held several 
members of the family hostage for a brief period. After releasing the 
hostages he refused to surrender, forcing police to use tear gas. After 
entering the house they found the suspected murderer had commit­
ted suicide.
The tear gas permeated the residence, making it unliveable. 
The court awarded the Applicant the maximum $5,000 for property
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26 The exception is Prince Edward Island.
27 New Brunswick's statute also differs in that an application for an award is made to 
a judge and not to a compensation board, as is the case in the other provinces.
28 New Zealand was the first country to pass this type of legislation, in 1964. See 
Linden, Canadian Tort Law (1975), at p. 46. See also McCaw, Sir K. “Compensa- 
sation to Victims of Crimes of Violence” (1976), 8 Aust. J. o f Forensic Sciences 
126-135.
29 The only viable alternative was an ex gratia payment (see infra). However, as a 
limit o f $5,000 (in respect o f each victim) is imposed in relation to property loss by 
s. 17 (3) (b) of the New Brunswick statute, the possibility of an ex gratia payment 
will have to be pursued anyway in cases involving extensive destruction, such as 
burned houses.
30 The judgment, given by Mr. Justice Abbis o f the County Court o f New Brunswick 
on September 3 ,1974, is unreported. As a criminal act was involved the loss might 
be more properly attributed to the suspect, and only indirectly to the police.
I
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damage occurring “during or resulting from the lawful arrest of or 
attempt to lawfully arrest a person committing or suspected of 
having committed an offence under a statute of Canada or New 
Brunswick.” 31
EX GRATIA PAYMENTS
The last resort for the victim who has no hope of redress by 
either common law or statute is to explore the possibility that the 
Crown will compensate him anyway, out of a sense of moral respon­
sibility. This form of compensation is not available as of right; it is 
not a remedy which can be obtained in a court of law, although it 
may be obvious to the court that such a payment would be a just 
solution in some cases.
In Crowe v. Noon, Mr. Justice Pennell encouraged the Crown to 
consider such a payment:
I add a concluding observation, though I cannot tell whether it will be use­
ful. It is evident that the conclusion I have reached will result, if  effect is 
given to it. in leaving the plaintiff without compensation for 12 days of 
imprisonment which he has undeservedly suffered. The remedy, assuming
I have reached the correct decision, lies outside a Court o f law. In the 
circumstances. I am tempted to paraphrase the words o f Justice Robert 
Jackson of the Supreme Court o f the United States: The final protection 
against the invasion of individual liberty by members of officialdom is the 
attitude of society and of its political forces rather than its legal machinery.
It is perhaps hardly necessary to add that I have neither the duty not the 
right to inquire into the merits o f a moral right to compensation. I have 
only jurisdiction to deal with points of law raised before me and to 
determine to the best o f my ability whether there is a claim in law. But I do 
not believe that I breach the canons of legal propriety by respectfully 
suggesting that the law officer o f the Crown might wish to consider whether 
this is a case in which justice might be done by way of an ex gratia 
payment. 32
One of the problems with ex gratia payments is that it may 
make a great deal of difference which police department caused the 
injury or damage, just as there may be a difference between being 
run down by a lunatic or by a “ normal” driver — the law may allow 
you to recover damages against the latter, but may not against the 
form er.33 The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, for example, with 
all the resources of the federal government behind it, may be in the 
position to offer a large ex gratia payment, up to and including the
31 Section 3(2) (a).
32 Crowe v. Noon, supra, footnote 21. at p. 32. As a former Solicitor General of 
Canada. Mr. Justice Pennell would be more familiar with the existence o f ex gratia 
payments than most Justices.
33 e.g. Buckley v Smith Transport Ltd.. [1946]4 D.L.R. 721 (Ont.C.A.).
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replacement cost of a house. A small municipal department may not 
be able to offer anything. In between the two extremes may be vast 
differences in policy and financial restrictions.
Another problem is that the granting of an ex gratia payment, 
even when described as an act of moral responsibility, is in most 
cases an act of simple self-interest, made with the idea of good 
public relations uppermost in mind. In effect, the payment says that 
even though we caused you damage for which we are not legally 
liable, we will compensate you anyway because we may need your 
goodwill (and that of your friends, relatives, associates, neighbours 
etc.) again in the future. Thus it may make a great deal of difference, 
again, whether the door that is battered down belongs to the suspect 
or to a third party, for example his landlord. The landlord may be 
asked for his co-operation again; the suspect normally does not feel 
kindly toward the police in any event - past or future!
As a result, the initiative in ex gratia payments normally comes 
from the police. If they have the resources available to them, and the 
necessary inclination, an ex gratia payment may be offered. The 
potential recipient will then have two choices - to take it and execute 
a release, or to refuse it and take his chances in a court of law. He 
will normally find that the matter is not negotiable beyond that 
point.34
One cannot blame the police, who are not compelled to start the 
ex gratia process in the first place. It would take very little effort, 
however, to produce a more structured plan, merely by broadening 
the scope of the various existing Acts to compensate victims of 
crimes.
CONCLUSION
Little attention has been paid, to date, to the innocent victims of 
police actions. This lack of concern is due, in large part, to the 
infrequent occurrence of major problems, such as the deaths of 
innocent bystanders in the Priestman case, or the total destruction of 
a dwelling house. Routine happenings involving minor damage and 
injuries such as broken doors, bent fenders and bloody noses, draw 
less attention and, in any event, may be patched up through the 
medium of ex gratia payments or awards under victims of crime 
legislation. It is only rarely that a civil action will be either successful 
or a financially reasonable step to take in the circumstances.
34 In the affair o f the burned house, supra, an assessor estimated the insured replace­
ment value at just over S21,000, about one-quarter of the amount claimed by the 
owner. She initially refused an ex gratia payment for that amount, but the offer 
was kept open and she eventually accepted it.
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Ex gratia payments have, over the years, corrected many poten­
tial injustices, but the device suffers from two major drawbacks. 
First, they are an act of benevolence and are not available as of right. 
Second, the onus is on the victim to select a police force possessing 
good financial resources to be injured by! If he “chooses” the 
R.C.M.P. or a large municipal department to injure or damage his 
person or property, he will be in most cases potentially far better off 
than if he “ selects” a small department with no budget for “extras” .
A solution? Modification of the various schemes of compensa­
tion to victims of crime specifically to cover victims of law enforce­
ment as well. Although it is now possible in most jurisdictions to 
obtain redress for bodily injury or death at the hands of a criminal 
and, perhaps indirectly, by blaming the criminal, when the police 
cause injury or death in pursuing him, it would be far better to 
specifically compensate for harm done by the police.
Provision should also be made by those provinces whose com­
pensation schemes are silent on the issue for property damage by 
police. Although it is understandable why most compensation 
schemes do not provide for property loss or damage by criminals (no 
budget could withstand the potential claims) it is otherwise when the 
damage is caused by the police, because of its relative infrequency.
For the same reason, a limit on the amount of damage to be 
compensable would be unrealistic when applied to a police action. 
Although rare, the extreme cases, involving death to bystanders or 
loss of home and possessions, are the very ones where the amount 
payable should be potentially unlimited.
Salus populi est suprema lex . . . but not today, and especially 
not when an innocent person suffers at the hands of those who are 
sworn to protect him.
